. . . In This Issue.

Douglas Hill Speaks on Game Theory and Humanism.

Quote of the Month - Anne Louise- Germaine deStael.

Excerpts from Paul Ricci's Talk on "Forbidden Fruit" by Paul Kurtz.

Philosopher's Corner "Concerning Ricc's Presentation" by Juan Bernal, Ph.D.

"Running a Country by Blackmail" Jerry Parks.

"Random Thoughts" - humor.

 

At the August 17th Meeting:

Douglas Hill speaks on Game Theory and Humanism.

The title of my talk will be "Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium, and Ethics." I will discuss how analytic philosophers are now using game theory to study ethical issues. It will include a discussion of the "Nash Equilibrium," and how the film A Beautiful Mind got it wrong. I'll also discuss the famous "Prisoner's Dilemma," why this is a problem for all of us (and not just prisoners), and whether, or how we can solve this problem. (I'll present just a little math to do these.) If time permits, I'll talk a bit about evolutionary game theory and how this helps us solve some puzzles in evolution (both biological and cultural).

Douglas E. Hill has a B.S. in Mathematics/Computer Science from Albertson College of Idaho, an M.S. in Biomathematics from UCLA, and M.A. in Philosophy from UCI, and is now writing a Ph.D. in Philosophy at UCI. (Much of his talk will be part of the introduction to his dissertation.) Mr. Hill is also

a Graduate Student in Logic & Philosophy of Science, UC Irvine, the Host of Campus Talk UCI, on KUCI 88.9 FM (Fridays 4-5 p.m. starting in August), and Vice-President of Students for Science & Skepticism at UCI.

Quote of the Month

"I believe that happiness consists in having a destiny in keeping with our abilities. Our desires are things of the moment, often harmful even to ourselves; but our abilities are permanent, and their demands never cease." Anne-Louise-Germaine de Stael; (1766 -1817) French writer.

XCERPTS FROM PAUL RICCI'S TALK ON "FORBIDDEN FRUIT" by Paul Kurtz

Kurtz then diverges, briefly, into metaethics and points out how different philosophers have introduced different criteria for making moral value judgments. To my disappointment, he doesn’t seem to think any of the classical or modem standards or criteria upon which morality might be placed have succeeded. His decision is to take the best from all the different ethical systems, a kind of moral eclecticism. As a philosopher, I find such a solution disheartening, to say the least. He does not take the view of logical positivists that moral statements are cognitively meaningless and that there are no bases for any moral system. Yet he comes to the conclusion that none of the criteria for evaluating ethical principles have ultimately succeeded. He thinks all these efforts are simplistic and cannot be reduced to an ultimate principle; we need to take a little from each, presumably, except from the Christian basis of morality. In my estimation, it is little wonder that non-Humanists are so critical of the moral basis of our belief system; we really have none if we take the stand that Paul Kurtz advocates.

So, Kurtz concludes there are two sources for the ethical life. General prima facie moral principles to which we are not absolutely committed, and a wide range of moral values. I presume amongst these moral values are what have been traditionally called virtues or--in more modem terminology-- dispositions or moral habits.

In Part II, Kurtz takes up what he calls the "common moral decencies" which are rules or principles upon which we act in everyday life. He believes these are common to all civilized societies, there being little disagreement as to what they are regardless of what moral realm they may be associated. These are core general principles though not to be held absolutely. At this point he emphasizes the lack of any real moral standard to justify these common decencies. At times he seems to think they are justified simply because they have been around for millennia, at other times because they have had beneficial consequences to society. However, he warns us against a purely utilitarian basis (the greatest good for the greatest number) for these principles on the grounds that certain well-established principles may be "compromised" in order to achieve a greater good. So he explains that moral principles have an autonomy of their own, they have an intrinsic worth, apparently above and beyond their benefit to individuals or society as a whole. Clearly this is a Kantian position and is not at all consistent with a consequentialist point of view. Eclecticism may be fine at the level of rules and principles but how can one possibly use different criteria, different standards, by which to justify these principles in the first place? No wonder many non-Christians take our moral position to be untenable!

Kurtz does attempt to justify the difference between moral relativism and subjectivism. To say moral principles are relative means they are relative to human concerns and rooted in human experience, not to each other. What’s right or wrong for me is also right or wrong for you as well (generally speaking). Subjectivism takes the extreme position that what’s right for me may be wrong for you and vice-versa; all ethical beliefs are equally good (or bad). There are no principles equally right (or wrong) for all humans. Kurtz calls his position objective relativism though this sounds self-contradictory. As he states: "Moral imperatives have a socio-biological basis, they are rooted in the nature of the human animal and the processes of evolution by which the species adapts and survives." So now he shifts back to a consequentialist foundation for ethics! The pragmatic basis for his Humanist foundation of morality shows up most clearly here.

 

PHILOSOPHER’S CORNER: CONCERNING RICCI’S PRESENTATION

By Juan Bernal, a worker in the field.

At our July meeting, July 20, Paul Ricci spoke to us on the subject of ethics. He gave us some basic points for approaching ethical philosophy, along with a short critique of the ethical writings of Paul Kurtz. As usual, much of Mr. Ricci’s presentation was helpful to anyone seeking a better understanding of moral philosophy. But some of the ideas presented by Mr. Ricci provoked me to question and delve more into what he had to say. So I offer this humble criticism in the spirit of philosophical dialogue.

I don’t find that Kurtz’s writings on ethics are as lacking and inconsistent as Mr. Ricci claims. Ricci’s main points seems to be that Kurtz does not approach ethics in a consistent way, dealing with all the basic problems that must be dealt with at the outset, such as the question, Why should we be moral? Some of these may be valid points against Kurtz, although I’m not persuaded that the Kurtz approach has been exposed as philosophically inadequate. But this is not the dialogue that I want to take up now. What I want to focus on are other points that Mr. Ricci brought out.

When discussing the benefits to be gained from a study of ethics, Ricci stated (in his written handout) that the study of ethics brings about:

Increased consistency: One reason the "unexamined life is not worth living"* (Socrates) is because only through constant examination of moral beliefs and practices can we realize if, or when, we are inconsistent. Although we may not be able to make all our beliefs consistent, it is important . . . to do our utmost to be consistent. Also, inconsistent beliefs negate one another and leave one with no positive course of action in different situations.

Later in his presentation, Mr. Ricci asserted that the morally conscientious person who also engages in philosophical examination of his ethical beliefs (principles) is a better moral person as a result of carrying on this philosophical examination.

It is not surprising that someone in field of philosophy, like Mr. Ricci, gives much importance to philosophical reflection on morality and the goal of holding consistent beliefs or principles. I agree that philosophical reflection is a worthy activity and consistency a worthy goal. However, I question the assumption that these things constitute moral virtue. Ricci stated that if we were to compare two individuals, say Socrates and Ricci’s father, [in part my example] both of whom act according to the Golden Rule, but only one (Socrates) engages in philosophical examination of the Golden Rule, then we would say that Socrates is the better moral agent. On the contrary, I seems that the case should be described as follows: Both Socrates and Ricci’s father are equally good moral agents (so far as both act according to the Golden Rule), but Socrates displays intellectual or philosophical excellence lacking in Ricci’s father.

Moreover, Ricci seems to blur the difference between the student of ethical theory, on the one hand, and the moral agent, on the other hand. When I analyze my moral beliefs and work to make them consistent, I am acting as a student of moral philosophy. Whether I do it well or poorly is a matter of intellectual virtue or excellence. Moreover, my doing the intellectual task well does not imply that I will act according to the principles in question. An excellent philosopher of ethics can be a poor moral agent. He may be very good at analysis and rational discourse about ethical theory, but go home after work and abuse his wife and children. On the other hand, the kind of moral agent you are is established by the way you conduct yourself in life. Do you treat others so as to respect their rights and dignity? Do you generally act according to accepted principles and values? Do you meet your moral obligations and responsibilities? One can be an excellent moral agent and never have been a student of ethical philosophy (i.e., never studied or reflected on ethical philosophy). So far as one’s conduct in the world is concerned, failing to following Socrates’ dictum about the examined life does not reduce one’s moral virtue.

Finally, consistency by itself is no guarantor of moral excellence, or even a necessary factor leading to moral excellence. The more important question concerns the kind of ethical principles and values that are being practiced. For example, I would reject the "moral framework" of the slave-holder, or of the Nazi, because of the principles or values that he follows, not because his "theory" is inconsistent. The theory might very well be a consistent system, but one based on repugnant principles.

* Of course, the Socratic idea that the unexamined life is not worth living expresses a value for some intellectuals, especially some philosophers. But I seriously question the implication that countless lives of people who lived a morally good life (so far as they were able), but did not have the time or leisure to engage in philosophical examination of their live, were unworthy lives. Socrates and his friends had plenty of time to question, debate, and examine life. But, what about the slaves and common workers, who made it possible for Socrates and friends to lead lives of leisure and philosophical reflection? "Their lives were not worthwhile," the philosophers tell us. Really now, where is the actual moral deficit here?

Ricci's Response to Bernal

Paul Ricci

Perhaps a few comments on Juan Bernal's retort to part of my lecture on ethics is warranted here since there was a limited time to develop the claims I had made during the lecture. I suspect, also, I tried to cover too many points in the allotted time. My apologies; Mr. Bernal especially took issue with the section on "Increased consistency" as a benefit of a more detailed discussion of morality.

To begin with, the four "benefits" of a discussion of morality, to which I referred to in my handout [increased clarity of your beliefs, increased assurance that your beliefs are reasonable or true, uncovering hidden assumptions in our belief system, and increased consistency], are part the more general benefits of critical thinking with which we should discuss any philosophical or practical issue facing us in everyday life.

If it is reasonable to be consistent in advocating a position on free-will vs. determinism, or on who to marry, or the best political system, then why is it not reasonable to be consistent in the realm of morality? It seems to me consistency is valuable in any area. But, perhaps, what it means to be consistent in the area of morality is not especially clear; that wasn't addressed in any detail.

We can be morally inconsistent in a number of ways. One is by believing in a particular moral principle but never acting according to it. For example, some Christians maintain that we should " love the sinner, but hate the sin." In the case of homosexuals, this would mean they love the homosexual but hate what they do. Yet they oppose all social efforts to help gays and lesbians attain the same rights and privileges as heterosexuals. Now this opposition on their part seems to me to contradict their claim that they love homosexuals; you don't love a

group and at the same time deny them the rights others have in society. They are, in my estimation, hypocritically giving "lip service" to their

moral principle of love but not acting upon it.

Another kind of inconsistency is to believe in principles that appear to be, without further qualification, inconsistent with one another and leave us with no positive way to act in certain situations. For example, Libertarians claim we should not act altruistically, for the benefit of others at the expense of ourselves, yet they will often tell us we should help our friends and family members as a general rule when they need such help. They don't tell us how they adjudicate between these two inconsistent principles. We all face similar problems of adjudication in our lives.

Yet anther way to be inconsistent in the moral realm is to use a different set of moral criteria or standards by which to judge which principles or rules we should establish. This is the one we discussed at the lecture and the one with which I took Paul Kurtz to task. I would still maintain this kind of inconsistency will lead to confusion or, at least, picking and choosing arbitrarily from some standard but not another. It raises the problem of knowing when to use what standard upon which to base a particular moral principle one might favor.

Christians are notorious for doing just that. Their first criterion is to obey the will or word of God, but more often than not they may use the utilitarian standard or base moral principles on self-evidence or whatever happens to be convenient for them. But if one uses either of the last two standards, then why use God in the first place? If we don't accept this flip-flopping for them, why should we accept it for Humanists or anyone else?

Is it a moral virtue to be consistent in the above ways? I don't believe I committed myself to a "yes" answer to the question though it certainly is an intellectual virtue and part of the more general aspect of good critical thinking. Perhaps Mr. Bernal is raising the question of whether or not we are morally obligated to be consistent. I'm not sure where I stand on that issue but I have little doubt that consistency is one important step in developing a better moral system compared to one who ignores that step, generally at least. Granted that some students of deep moral discussion end up being rather immoral as judged by Kurtz's

"common decencies," it doesn't follow that such thinkers are never helped by such deep thought. To the contrary, the Socratic dictum, "The unexamined life is not worth living," is, I admit, overstretching a bit and, perhaps, it should not be taken quite literally. However, it does emphasize the importance of using rationality (part of which is recognizing consistency) in moral discussion as well as in other areas and with this, I agree with Paul Kurtz.

Mr. Bernal claims one need not be consistent at all in being a good moral person and, of course, with this I would agree. There are few guarantees in this world. Some --such as my own father, to use him again-- were just born morally decent human beings, an accident of nature or upbringing, or whatever, without ever having thought about morality in detail. Not all of us are quite so lucky in forming these principles and character with little thought. Most of us have to work at it. However, I think my father, and others like him, would have achieved an even greater level of moral sensitivity had he done more thinking about morality. I could give some examples from his life to illustrate this point but space is limited here, and privacy a concern as well.

Finally, I will concede that consistency--or any of the other benefits of examining one's moral system cited above-- is no guarantor of moral excellence or even a necessary condition for it, but--unless Socrates was totally wrong-- consistency greatly helps. Mr. Bernal's example of the internal consistency of the Nazi moral framework which ended in disaster for millions and repugnant to most of us is interesting but has at least two flaws in it. First, the Nazi moral framework was inconsistent with the science known in his day (the belief in the superiority of the Aryan "race") and inconsistent with the common moral decencies as described by Paul Kurtz. The internal consistency of moral principles, whether that of Hitler or of the Catholic Church, does not make a system good or bad in itself. To judge the system as a whole, we also need to look at the criterion (or standard) upon which it is based as well as those principles upon which most of us agree are noteworthy.

However, without some sort of internal consistency, neither system would have had much of a following; this is the first step in developing an adequate moral system.

With the above, I hope I have answered at least some of Mr. Bernal's reservations about moral consistency and, perhaps, for some of the rest of you who attended the lecture as well.

Running a Country by Blackmail

By Jerry Parks

That long-time business magazine, Fortune, recently ran an article about how "lobbying" works in our government offices. It was just another article about business as usual, but headlined one of the more successful lobbying organizations (they get monthly retainers of $20,000 or more from new clients) and thus are of significance in the business world. What is interesting is that - ho, hum - the article happened to make mention of a typical way the lobbyists "twist arms" to get the votes that their clients want. Apparently their persuasive powers include such ploys as giving "friendly warnings", to those who might cast votes against their clients, that they had TV ads ready to run that would label any lawmaker who voted against them as incompetent (and worse) and that they had $4 million authorized to pay for the airing of such ads! Apparently a little blackmail is simply accepted in the same business world where company published accounting figures turn out to be whatever the executives want them to be!

Another article in the same magazine - written as a Horatio Alger success story - was about a housewife in Arizona who had "taken on" Warren Buffet - and won!

What was she objecting to that Buffet had done? Berkshire shareholders were allowed to designate $18 per share annually for up to three charities of their choosing and thus some of that money ended up in pro-choice causes like Planned Parenthood (as well as anti-choice organizations). She objected to any money being given to pro-choice causes because of her "Christian" values, and organized a boycott of one of the Berkshire companies to stop the donation program. Berkshire abandoned the program. Now she wants to keep Warren Buffet from giving any of his personal money to pro-choice causes on threat of more boycotts against Berkshire! Of course, giving money to anti-choice causes is approved! Fortune, apparently, didn’t see any ethical problems here. What’s wrong with a little blackmail, after all?

Then there has been recent note made of some congressional chairmen threatening members of their committees that anyone who votes against what the president wants will never get anything approved by the committee!

Just blackmail as usual! Ho, hum.

Random Thoughts!

The easiest way to find something lost around the house is to buy a replacement.

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Health is merely the slowest possible rate at which one can die.

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Give a person a fish and you feed them for a day; teach that person to use the Internet and they won't bother you for weeks.

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Have you noticed since everyone has a camcorder these days no one talks about seeing UFOs like they use to?

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In the 60's, people took acid to make the world weird. Now the world is weird and people take Prozac to make it normal.

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How is it one careless match can start a forest fire, but it takes a whole box to start a campfire?

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